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ABSTRACT 
Symbolic Versus Sustainable: Tracking the Apparel Industry’s  
Response to Crisis Over Time 
by 
Sadelle R. Crabb, Master of Science 
Utah State University, 2017 
Major Professor: Christy Glass 
Department: Sociology 
In this study I investigate the impact different director types have on firm 
commitments to voluntary labor regulation. Using an author-constructed dataset of eight 
focal firm’s boards of directors for a nineteen-year period, I examine the impacts of 
gender and racial diversity, as well as the inclusion of independent interlocking board 
members on firm commitments to voluntary labor regulation following a legitimacy crisis 
in the 1990s. Framing firms’ responses within a chronological approach to institutional 
theory, I test how trends for these three director types varied for firms most and least 
committed to voluntary labor regulation, as well as for firms that underwent bankruptcy, 
an acquisition, or split into various firms between 1996 and 2014. Findings suggest that 
firms view gender and racial diversity in similar ways, but independent interlocks as a 
separate strategy. All firms increased the number of women and racial minorities on their 
boards, with least committed firms having the highest percentages of both over this entire 
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period. Use of independent interlocks increased at a moderate rate for most committed 
firms, decreased over time for least committed firms, and increased significantly for firms 
going through additional crises (bankruptcy, an acquisition, or splitting up). This study 
contributes to theory and research on organizational change by extending understanding 
of mechanisms that drive organizational change in response to crisis by analyzing internal 
normative mechanisms that shaped firms’ responses. It extends research on board 
composition by analyzing the conditions under which board diversity and interlocked 
board members are sought by focal firms. Understanding how and why board diversity 
and independent interlock membership serve as mechanisms of internal, normative 
change provides insight into what internal mechanisms shape organizational policies and 
practices, and provide a correction to the over-focus on external, coercive mechanisms in 
existing scholarship. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the mid-1990s, the apparel and footwear industry faced a legitimacy crisis 
stemming from intense public backlash for their labor practices in global supply chains. 
Concerns over sweatshop production abroad included issues of unsafe working 
conditions, provision of extremely low wages, as well as employing very young workers 
(Spar 2002). This was a period of strong political organizing against the industry, and 
aggressive campaigns were launched by labor groups, NGOs, and student groups such as 
“Students Against Sweatshops.” These efforts aimed to raise public awareness of harmful 
corporate practices in relation to labor rights in global manufacturing (USAC & 
Featherstone 2002; Gereffi et al. 2001).  
Following intense media attention and subsequent public outcry, President 
Clinton called for a Presidential taskforce to study the issue, and called leaders in the 
apparel and footwear industry to meet with representatives of NGOs, unions, and the US 
Department of Labor. When industry leaders met with labor activists alongside President 
Clinton in 1996, they formed the Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP). The AIP crafted a 
code of conduct to guide industry labor practices, and subsequently established the Fair 
Labor Association (FLA) in 1999 to implement and monitor this code (Gereffi et al. 
2001, Hemphill 1999). Thus, these founding firms voluntarily agreed upon constructing a 
shared labor standard for the industry (crafted by the AIP) as well as to voluntary 
regulation of labor practices (monitored by the FLA). These voluntary actions reflected a 
collective attempt to overcome this legitimacy crisis in the short term. 
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Since the formation of the FLA, much scholarship has analyzed the efficacy of the 
FLA’s (and similar voluntary regulatory organizations’) certification strategies—
specifically, the monitoring standards for implementation of the codes of conduct (Pruett 
et al. 2005; Emmelhainz & Adam 1999; O’Rourke 2003; Conner & Dent 2006; 
Distelhorst et al. 2015a; Distelhorst et al. 2015b; Locke et al. 2007a; Locke et al. 2007b). 
While many scholars have critiqued the efficacy of voluntary regulation in general, 
scholars have also sought to distinguish supply chain management efforts that seek to 
transform and sustain best practices from those aimed merely at symbolically addressing 
activist concerns (Weaver et al. 1999; MacLean & Behnam 2010; Seuring and Mueller 
2010). 
Most scholarship on the evolution of global labor standards in the apparel industry 
has focused on external pressures (such as political organizing) as the primary 
mechanism driving organizational change in the industry (e.g., Spar 2002; Emmelhainz & 
Adams 1999; Seuring & Mueller 2008). Much less scholarly attention has focused on the 
internal pressures and mechanisms that shaped corporate policies and practices in 
response to the crisis. Recent scholarship provides mounting evidence that internal 
changes to firms’ governance—namely, increased diversity on the board of directors 
and/or the appointment of independent interlocked board directors—are associated with 
stronger efforts to achieve corporate social responsibility (CSR) outcomes (Fondas & 
Sassalos 2000; Brown et al. 2002; Hillman et al. 2002; Bear et al. 2010; Glass et al. 
2015). However, there is a lack of scholarship concerning the conditions that motivate 
organizations to seek more diverse board members (women and/or racial minorities) 
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and/or independent interlocked directors and the mechanisms by which such leaders 
facilitate organizational change.  
This study fills that gap by analyzing how the current system of voluntary 
regulation was established, and testing whether or not the development of this system in 
the short, medium, and long terms was (at least in part) the result of specific and 
deliberate internal changes to the composition of focal firms’ boards of directors (BODs). 
Specifically, this study asks: did firms respond to the legitimacy crisis in the 1990s by 
seeking to alter the composition of their boards of directors, either through the 
appointment of women and minority directors and/or through the appointment of 
independent interlocked directors? And was this adaptive strategy sustained over time 
through the short, mid, and long term periods?  
Positioning the increased BOD diversity and CSR outcomes research within the 
symbolic versus sustainable labor governance debate, I hypothesize that firms that have 
maintained their commitment to voluntary labor monitoring to the present day 
(representing firms attempting to transform and sustain best practices) will have pursued 
changes to BOD compositions towards the inclusion of more independent interlocked 
board members and/or more women/racial minorities serving as board members over 
time. Conversely, I hypothesize that firms whose commitments to voluntary labor 
monitoring have dissolved by the present day (representing firms whose changes are of a 
more symbolic nature) will exhibit inclusion of more diverse board members in the short 
run, but will have returned to more of a “business as usual” board composition, featuring 
mostly white men, for the medium and long terms.  
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By answering these questions, this study advances the literature in three ways. 
First, it extends our understanding of mechanisms that drive organizational change in 
response to crisis by analyzing internal normative mechanisms that shaped firms’ 
responses. Second, it extends research on board composition by analyzing the conditions 
under which board diversity and interlocked board members are sought by focal firms. 
Thirdly, understanding how and why board diversity and independent interlock 
membership serve as mechanisms of internal, normative change will provide insight into 
what internal mechanisms shape organizational policies and practices, and provide a 
correction to the over-focus on external, coercive mechanisms in existing scholarship. 
Lastly, findings relating firms going through additional crises with drastically increased 
use of independent interlocks provides new avenue for research.  
I begin in the next section by reviewing how the current system of voluntary 
regulation of global labor practices was established. Next, I situate the relevant literature 
within the framework of a chronological approach to institutional theory, and distinguish 
between the different mechanisms institutional theory provides that contribute to 
organizational change: coercive, mimetic, and normative. I then introduce my deductive, 
explanatory trend analysis of how many independent interlocking and/or female and 
racial minority directors were on focal boards in the short, mid, and long terms between 
1996-2014. Subsequently, in the findings I demonstrate that both the least and most 
committed firm groups pursued a strategy to appoint more female directors, more racial 
minority directors, and more independent interlocking directors to their boards over this 
period. However, the group of firms least committed to voluntary labor regulation had the 
5 
 
highest percentages of directors in each of these categories over this entire period (1996-
2014), contrary to the hypothesized relationships. Finally, I discuss the theoretical 
implications of this BOD management strategy for scholars discussing sustainable supply 
chain management, as well as the implications it may have for both theory and practice 
related to global labor governance practices now and in the future. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
The History of Labor Regulation in the Global Apparel Industry 
By the 1990s, globalization of the apparel industry (similar to other secondary 
labor sector industries such as manufacturing) had resulted in the geographical dispersion 
of the production process. This global division of labor often spanned several countries 
throughout the process and was characterized by brand’s dealing with various contracted 
and subcontracted suppliers. The global division of labor incentivized retailers and brands 
to push the risks of production associated with demands for cheaper apparel items further 
down the division of labor pipeline towards the contractors and subcontractors.  
Stemming from these increased pressures on contractors and subcontractors in the 
global production process, reports of labor abuses gained critical media attention in the 
early to mid-1990s. Much of this critical media attention was directed at Nike, who was a 
visible industry leader during this period. As early as 1992, Nike was the primary target 
of labor activist and sweatshop critic Jeff Ballinger, who ran the AAFLI office in 
Indonesia where Nike had numerous operations (Spar 2002). In the August 1992 issue of 
Harper’s magazine, Ballinger published a comparison of a typical Nike paystub from an 
Indonesian factory and Michael Jordan’s Nike endorsement contract. This comparison 
reported that it would take an Indonesian worker 44,492 years to make the equivalent pay 
of Jordan’s endorsement contract, sparking outrage among American consumers (Spar 
2002). Over the next few years other media outlets soon followed suit in posting articles 
critical of Nike’s global labor practices including Nike’s hometown newspaper: the 
Portland Oregonian, Life magazine, and editorials in Business Week (Spar 2002).  
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Additionally, some scholars viewed the role of Charles Kernaghan—executive 
director of the National Labor Committee—as pivotal in bringing media attention to the 
apparel industry’s labor issues. Kernaghan testified before Congress on April 29, 1996 
about the garment manufacturing of the Kathy Lee Gifford label, retailed by Wal-Mart. 
He revealed that Honduran girls as young as 13 years old were working under armed 
guard for approximately 31 cents per hour (Hemphill 1999). Responding to the media 
attention on Nike, Kernaghan’s Congressional testimony, and the subsequent public 
outrage, President Clinton called for a Presidential taskforce to study the issue, and called 
leaders in the apparel and footwear industry—including Nike and Kathy Lee Gifford—to 
meet with labor activists. These industry representatives met with President Clinton and 
labor activists in 1996 and formed the Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP) with 18 
original corporate members (Hemphill 1999). The AIP issued a report to President 
Clinton on April 14, 1997 containing agreed-upon “Workplace Code of Conduct” and 
“Principles of Monitoring” documents that were to be included in a formal “Partnership 
Agreement” (Hemphill 1999). 
Following this agreement, members of the AIP committed to form an association 
to enforce these new standards in the following 6 months. However, further progress on 
the Partnership Agreement was grid-locked throughout 1998, due to the failure of 
member firms to comply with the demands of the labor activists for the inclusion of a 
provision of a “living wage” to be paid to workers, restrictions for operating in countries 
that repress unions, and for a higher percentage of manufacturing facilities to be 
externally monitored annually (Hemphill 1999). From this gridlock, nine of the original 
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eighteen members continued to meet throughout 1998 and eventually provided the 
Clinton Administration with a finished Partnership Agreement on November 3, 1998. 
The Fair Labor Association (FLA) was formed from the final AIP members, and with the 
intention of facilitating the voluntary implementation of the “Workplace Code of 
Conduct” and “Principles of Monitoring” of the Partnership Agreement in the production 
facilities of member firms (Hemphill 1999).  
The primary function of the FLA and other regulatory organizations is to assess 
production facilities through scheduled audits (Hemphill 1999). The regulatory 
organizations essentially assess the implementation of the codes of conduct and on-site 
interviews with facility employees; they then certify firms based on their results and 
provide publicly accessible reports of their findings. Since the formation of the FLA in 
1999, this voluntary regulation has been the dominant model used to monitor labor 
standards in facilities around the world and still is today. Although it started in the 
apparel and footwear industry exclusively, these organizations have since branched out 
into serving industries “from agriculture and technology to apparel and footwear” (Fair 
Labor Association 2016). The FLA’s most notable entrance into the tech industry was in 
2012, when Apple joined their ranks as a member company and opened their notorious 
Foxconn factory facilities in China to FLA inspection. Today the FLA has over 40 
member firms, several representatives of civil society organizations, and university 
representatives; however, no union representation. 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Originally formulated to explain how organizations respond to uncertainty, 
DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983) theory of institutional isomorphism provides a range of 
mechanisms that contribute to organizational change. “Isomorphism” refers to 
constraining forces that make units within a given environment more similar to one 
another through simultaneous pressures. In the case of institutional isomorphism, these 
units are organizations. This concept is especially valuable when considering ways in 
which—aside from economic competition—organizations interact and affect one another: 
“organizations compete not just for resources and customers, but for political power and 
institutional legitimacy, for social as well as economic fitness” (DiMaggio & Powell 
1983, 150). Thus, this theoretical perspective is particularly relevant to understanding 
organizational responses to an exogenous crisis such as that facing the apparel industry in 
the 1990s. 
Chronological Approach to Institutional Theory 
This study applies the framework of institutional theory to the legitimacy crisis 
experienced by focal firms in the 1990’s with a unique approach: considering the 
isomorphic forces—coercive, mimetic, and normative—as shaping organizations in a 
chronological sequence rather than simultaneously. Specifically, this study considers the 
internal, normative organizational changes to corporate policies and practices that were 
triggered by the external, coercive forces of this legitimacy crisis. This chronological 
framework is applied to the apparel industry as a whole at the macro level. 
This chronological approach to institutional theory is based in part on the model 
developed by Seuring and Mueller (2010), describing “triggers for sustainable supply 
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chain management” (1703). In their model, external pressures and incentives from 
multiple groups (government, customers, and other stakeholders) are the initial “trigger” 
that pushes firms towards adopting more sustainable supply chain practices. Following 
these pressures, Seuring and Mueller note that firms “usually pass the pressure on to 
suppliers” through mechanisms such as codes of conduct (1703). More generally, Seuring 
and Mueller categorize firms’ responses to increased pressures in one of two ways: 
“supplier management for risks and performance”, more symbolic in nature, and “supply 
chain management for sustainable products”, more sustainable and focused on long-term 
transformation of supply chain management practices (1703).  
Organizational Change: Symbolic or Sustainable? 
In “supplier management for risks and performance”, the firm’s priority is 
centered-around reputation maintenance; their response under this strategy is to 
implement additional environmental and social criteria for evaluating their suppliers. This 
model is consistent with the actions of the member firms of the FLA because they opted 
to enforce codes of conduct in their suppliers’ production facilities. The second strategy, 
“supply chain management for sustainable products”, addresses the environmental and 
social impacts of products throughout the entire lifecycle—therefore, implementing 
standards throughout the supply chain is only one part of this more comprehensive 
strategy. Seuring and Mueller describe “sustainable products” as: “all kinds of products 
that have or aim at an improved environmental and social quality, which can be related 
back to the…implementation of environmental and social standards” (1705). This 
distinction between more sustainable responses (commitments to true transformation in 
the production process) and responses focused on risk management (more symbolic in 
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nature) informs the framework’s meso-level distinction between “symbolic” and 
“sustainable” commitments to changing their labor governance practices. The full 
theoretical framework is provided on the following page in Figure 1. 
Institutional Theory and Organizational Change 
Institutional theory is effective in analyzing the legitimacy crisis faced by the 
apparel and footwear industry in the 1990s because it specifically discusses the means by 
which organizations pursue change in order to secure legitimacy among various 
stakeholders in the environment. The theory posits that, at some point, organizations 
make changes aiming beyond increasing efficiency, and towards increasing legitimacy: 
“As an innovation spreads, a threshold is reached beyond which adoption provides 
legitimacy rather than improves performance” (DiMaggio & Powell 1983:148).  
The transition apparel firms made over the past 20 years epitomizes this 
sentiment: leaving behind practices of sweatshop labor, though economically efficient, 
and aiming towards improved labor governance strategies, to maintain legitimacy. 
According to the theory, three types of pressures motivate firms to alter practices and 
policies: coercive, mimetic and normative. Each of these pressures influence firms to 
adopt strategies that improve the performance of the firm but also advance the legitimacy 
of the firm’s practices in the eyes of various stakeholders. I review each of these 
mechanisms below before turning to the focal mechanisms of this study. 
Coercive pressures: 
Coercive pressures can be understood as external pressures that come from 
political influence and the issue of legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). They include 
formal mandates by the government or by other organizations they are dependent upon, 
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but they also include cultural expectations from the broader environment in which the 
organization operates within, such as consumers or competing firms. Thus, the 
social/political backlash and pressures exerted by formal and informal external sources in 
the 1990s—such as the US government, consumers, the media, and other politically 
organized groups—can be seen as coercive pressures. Additionally, actions taken by 
competing firms can be externally constraining and considered coercive. For example, 
when firms started to outsource production to Asian countries, this significantly 
decreased the costs of production so they could lower prices. In order to compete, other 
firms followed suit and also outsourced production to cut costs and maintain competitive 
price levels—thus, to remain competitive, they were coerced to take these actions by the 
external actions of their competitor firms.  
Scholarly focus since the formation of the FLA and other private third-party labor 
auditing organizations has primarily been on testing the efficacy of social auditing 
programs, codes of conduct, etc. For example, Pruett et al. (2005) details the emergence 
of social auditing to check working conditions for several companies in the mid-1990s, 
including Nike, Gap, Levi Strauss, and C&A. They conclude their overview with a 
critique that these social auditing efforts were “weak” and in need of help from 
independent, civil society organizations. This critique is similar to those waged by 
Emmelhainz & Adam (1999), who studied the new industry initiatives and corporate 
codes of conduct of the mid-1990s. They found that although many firms did have codes 
of conduct, they lacked uniformity across the industry, there was a major lack of detail 
within the codes, and they were overall too lenient in the area of monitoring and 
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enforcement. Looking at the new nongovernmental systems for advancing labor 
standards that had surfaced between 1998 and 2003 (including the FLA), O’Rourke 
(2003) concluded that these organizations needed new mechanisms for accountability to 
workers, greater transparency, and improved technical capacity. 
Alternatively, the reactions of the business community to the legitimacy crisis 
aimed to soothe investors’ concerns. Rivoli (2003) compared the changing expectations 
for humane labor practices to the industrial revolution, and suggested there would 
eventually be a compromise that would appease critics but still allow firms to make a 
reasonable profit (and thus still provide adequate shareholder returns). 
Mimetic pressures: 
Mimetic changes reflect efforts by organizations to seek legitimacy by modeling 
their behavior on that of other organizations in their field, and firms’ responses to 
mimetic pressures have been documented in previous literature (Galaskiewicz and 
Wasserman 1989; Haveman 1993; Kraatz 1998). Organizational mimicking is evident in 
the case of the apparel and footwear industry’s transition since the late 1990s. During that 
time, several smaller firms have joined the FLA. Today, over 40 firms belong to the 
organization (Fair Labor Association 2016). Additionally, other external regulatory 
organizations have formed, including the Sustainable Apparel Coalition (SAC), founded 
in 2009 by Wal-Mart and Patagonia and the Better Work program, founded in 2007, 
which represents a partnership between the UN’s International Labor Organization (ILO) 
and the International Finance Corporation (IFC),. The SAC includes over 160 members 
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from academia, brands, foundations, nonprofits, retailers and other sectors, and the Better 
Work program works with private enterprises in about 100 countries.  
Although mimetic pressures are clearly present in the apparel and footwear 
industry’s evolution from the 1990s to the present day, these pressures are not of primary 
concern to the current study. The focus of this study is on the internal adaptations of 
pioneering firms, not those mimicking these early adopters.  
Normative pressures: 
The key theoretical focus for this study, normative pressures can be understood as 
those related to institutional theory’s concept of “professionalization”, meaning: “the 
collective struggle of members of an occupation … to establish a cognitive base and 
legitimation for their occupational autonomy” (DiMaggio & Powell 1983:152). In this 
study, we extend this grouping from the focus on a shared occupation, to the entire 
apparel and footwear industry. Of central importance to the concept of 
professionalization are formal education and membership in professional networks. This 
study will also expand the concept of membership of individuals in professional networks 
to membership of whole organizations (focal firms) in external regulatory groups (such as 
the FLA).  
Importantly, institutional theory states that one mechanism that helps to facilitate 
normative pressures is the “filtering of personnel”, or, all professionals coming from 
similar backgrounds and having membership in professional networks making the leaders 
at the very top “virtually indistinguishable” (DiMaggio & Powell 1983:153). This 
phenomenon can contribute to homogeneity of thought in which novel or non-traditional 
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ideas and/or innovative solutions to complex problems are inhibited. The “filtering of 
personnel” is problematic when a firm (much less an entire industry) is faced with a 
legitimacy crisis; because top leaders are so similar, they will not tend to generate 
innovative problem solving strategies (Østergaard et al. 2011; Torchia et al. 2011).  
The filtering of personnel provides a basis for how normative pressures shape 
organizations in the same environment to be increasingly similar. Organizational or 
industry-level professional norms are reproduced through shared cognitive, cultural and 
demographic profiles of key personnel (DiMaggio & Powell 1983).  This concept can be 
extended to consider what conditions would pressure such norms to change. Considering 
previous scholarship linking diversity of leadership with changing CSR outcomes for the 
better, this project aims to understand whether the normative organizational responses to 
the coercive, external forces of the legitimacy crisis of the 1990s—the development of 
the voluntary labor regulation system (changed industry norms)—resulted at least in part 
from increased diversity among industry leadership (combating the filtering of personnel 
phenomenon). While homogeneity among key personnel would inhibit organizational 
change and innovation, increased diversity among leaders and decision-makers would 
allow for normative shifts in thinking and, potentially, organizational changes aimed at 
counter-acting or diffusing external critiques. Additionally, understanding the difference 
between firms’ supply chain management efforts that seek to transform and sustain best 
practices from those aimed merely at symbolically addressing activist concerns is 
paramount to understanding the depth of this normative shift—as well as substantive 
issues of labor rights and sustainability.  
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Dhanarajan (2005) describes the transition businesses underwent in their social 
and environmental responsibility policies from a “deny and defend” position to “paying 
penance” through analyzing a study conducted by Oxfam International focused on the 
retail sector’s donation and philanthropy practices. By 2005, retail firms in Oxfam’s 
study had transitioned into a phase based on risk management. This risk management is 
often characterized as those discussed in the coercive forces segment: firms instituting 
codes of conduct for their suppliers to follow concerning social and environmental 
responsibility, especially acceptable labor practices. Similar to Dhanarajan’s conclusions, 
other scholars consider risk management strategies—such as codes of conduct—to be a 
step in the right direction but ultimately inadequate. Many scholars conclude that future 
efforts of firms need to be supplemented with oversight from regulatory institutions, 
implementation of further policies and practices, and further involvement of civil society 
organizations (Egel-Zander 2007; Locke et al. 2007a; Locke 2009; Conner & Dent 2006; 
Distelhorst et al. 2015). 
In summary, the existing norms of the apparel and footwear industry were under 
intense scrutiny during the early 1990s by a variety of external stakeholders. It was clear 
to corporate leaders during this period that they would need to change their practices, as 
evidenced by the proliferation of codes of conduct, risk management programs, and 
participation in external regulation, such as that provided by the FLA. However, 
institutional theory posits that the “filtering of personnel” among top leaders with similar 
backgrounds will stunt firms’ ability to adequately adapt and identify innovative 
solutions during times of crisis.  
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From this dilemma we discern the focus of this study: did firms pursue internal, 
normative changes to counter-act the homogeneity of thought encouraged by the 
“filtering of personnel” and did these internal changes enable firms to navigate this crisis 
of legitimacy? Previous scholars have failed to analyze the internal mechanisms of 
change that initiated and/or implemented these responses.  By analyzing the increased 
involvement of independent interlocking board members and/or increased race and 
gender diversity of BOD membership, this study aims to better understand how and why 
these individuals have the documented associations with increased CSR outcomes. 
Understanding how and why these board members serve as mechanisms of internal, 
normative change could lend insight into their role as change-makers towards more 
sustainable organizational policies and practices, and provide a corrective to the 
consistent focus on external, coercive pressures to change in the literature today. 
 Hypothesized Mechanisms 
Within the context of the “filtering of personnel”, information sharing and 
decision-making among like-minded individuals will not necessarily maximize 
innovation. However, institutional theory provides an additional concept that allows for 
innovation: the exchange of information among professionals (DiMaggio & Powell 
1983). This concept allows for innovation only if individuals come from backgrounds 
different from those typically “filtered” to top-level management positions—typically 
white males with elite educational backgrounds. 
This project utilizes the concept of the exchange of information among 
professionals as a mechanism to counteract the homogeneity of thought that comes from 
the “filtering of personnel”. This concept is operationalized into two hypothesized 
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mechanisms, both of which make the board composition more diverse in nature. Firstly, 
this study looks at the appointment of professionals from outside of the firm to focal 
firms’ boards. The inclusion of independent board members provides outsiders with 
decision making power over firm governance. Further, independent directors that are 
interlocked—serving on one or more board(s) in addition to the focal firm’s board—have 
been documented as channels of communication and facilitators of information flows 
across firms (Mizruchi 1996; Shropshire 2010; Bazerman & Schoorman 1983).  
Secondly, this study looks at the appointment of professionals to focal firms’ 
boards that provide greater board diversity in terms of gender and racial composition. 
Previous research has documented an association between the inclusion of more women 
and/or racial minority board members and positive corporate policy changes, especially 
in regards to better CSR outcomes (Brown et al. 2002; Cook and Glass 2014; Glass et al. 
2015; Hillman et al. 2002). 
Interlocking Directors: 
This study tests whether bringing on an outsider that provides a fresh 
perspective—especially one with a unique background different from the majority of the 
firms’ top leadership—to the BOD was a strategy used by the founding firms of the FLA 
to navigate the legitimacy crisis of the early 1990s. These outsiders are referred to as 
independent “interlocks”, and are defined as individual whose primary employment is 
external to the company—an independent board member—and serves on multiple boards 
of directors—an interlocking director. An interlock is formed when an executive or board 
member joins the board of a separate firm, and thus facilitates a connection between the 
19 
 
two firms (Shropshire 2010; Mizruchi 1996). Interlocks have been identified as 
mechanisms for communication across firms (Mizruchi 1996; Shropshire 2010; 
Bazerman & Schoorman 1983) as well as mechanisms of reducing environmental 
uncertainty (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978; Bazerman & Schoorman 1983).  
This study’s focus on selecting interlocking directors as an organizational 
response during times of uncertainty is informed by previous research, including Hillman 
et al. (2000) which found that firms responded to significant changes in environment by 
shifting board composition to include more interlocks. More contemporary research has 
also pointed to interlocks as mechanisms of change, establishing a quantitative 
association between interlocking directors and positive social responsibility outcomes, 
especially related to environmental responsibility issues (Glass et al. 2015; Ortiz-de-
Mandojana et al. 2012). Additionally, Webb (2004) found that socially responsible firms 
have more characteristics associated with effective board structures, with one of those 
effective board structures being the inclusion of more interlocking board directors. 
Hypothesis 1: Apparel firms that have sustained their commitment to voluntary labor 
monitoring over time will be more likely than other firms to appoint interlocking 
directors to their boards between 1996 and 2014. 
 
Director Diversity: 
In addition to interlocked directors, board diversity has also been documented as a 
mechanism for organizational change. Women and racial/ethnic minorities bring 
perspectives and priorities to boards that otherwise are not present due to the “filtering of 
personnel”. Women and minorities affect companies because they bring different 
20 
 
perspectives—thus disrupting issues stemming from homogeneity of thought. Evidence 
of the limitations of filtered personnel for innovation risk management is provided by 
Brown et al. (2002). They found that firms with boards that included three or more 
women were significantly more likely to implement a code of conduct compared firms 
with all-male boards. 
Additionally, in their study of the relationship of racial/ethnic board diversity and 
equity initiatives, Cook and Glass (2014) found that a higher percent of minorities on the 
BOD was significantly related to better social and environmental practices. Further, a 
study by Glass et al. (2015) found gender diverse leadership teams to be more effective 
than their less diverse counterparts in pursuing environmentally friendly strategies. As 
these examples illustrate, when a company brings on more women and/or ethnic/racial 
minority directors, there are documented positive changes to social and environmental 
policies and practices. Non-traditional directors, female and/or racial minority board 
members, have been found to have differences of background important for counter-
acting the impacts of the “filtering of personnel”. For example, Hillman et al. (2002) 
found that female and racial minority board directors differ from white males in 
education, occupational background, and even in patterns of board affiliation.  
Hypothesis 2: Apparel firms that have sustained their commitment to voluntary labor 
monitoring over time will be more likely than other firms to appoint women and 
racial/ethnic minority directors to their boards between 1996 and 2014. 
To answer the research questions, this study employs a deductive/ explanatory 
trend analysis to better understand the role independent interlocking and/or more women 
and racial minority directors might have played in helping this global industry navigate 
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this legitimacy crisis since the 1990s. Results from the trend analysis will determine 
whether including independent interlocking directors and/or women and racial minority 
directors was a strategy these leading focal firms used in navigating this crisis. These 
trends might highlight divergent patterns in directors’ backgrounds between firms that 
were more dedicated to changing their global labor governance practices over time versus 
those whose commitment was of a more symbolic nature.  
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METHODS 
Research Design 
This project conducts a deductive/explanatory trend analysis to determine if firms 
that are most committed to voluntary regulation did in fact recruit more independent 
interlocks and/or female and racial minority directors between the years of 1996 to 2014 
than firms that are least committed (as theory and previous empirical studies suggests 
they will have). Further analysis will determine the average tenure of all directors and 
compare this with average tenure for independent interlocks, in order to determine 
whether or not these directors were added recently (short tenures) or were existing board 
members that just took on additional board memberships over this period. While all 
components analyzed—gender, race, tenure, independent status, and interlocking status—
is included in individual’s professional biographies, information for both hypotheses was 
compiled into the same author-constructed dataset.  
Sampling 
The ten focal firms selected are the firms of the Fair Labor Association (FLA) that 
were members by the first operational year (2001) and remained with the FLA through at 
least 2005, if not longer. This sample was selected because the formation of the FLA was 
the first initiative to regulate global labor governance practices of apparel and footwear 
brands that firms voluntarily consented to participate in (Fair Labor Association 2016). It 
was started in close conjunction with Nike, the highest valued apparel brand of 2015 
(Friedman 2015) and the frequent focus of supply chain management studies looking at 
global labor governance (Conner & Dent 2006; Distelhorst et al. 2015a; Distelhorst et al. 
2015b; Locke et al. 2007a; Locke et al. 2007b). 
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Several academic studies and news articles have included the FLA (and Nike, 
specifically) as integral components in the private regulation of global labor governance 
(Guthrie 2012; Locke et al. 2007b; Distelhorst et al. 2015b). Locke et al. (2007b) explain 
that these monitoring practices are “currently the principal way both global corporations 
and labor rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) address poor working 
conditions in global supply chain factories” (3).  
Further criteria for gauging firms’ commitment to the external, private regulation 
of global labor governance will be operationalized through membership in a similar 
organization, the Sustainable Apparel Coalition (SAC), founded in 2010. Specific points 
of commitment are outlined in the figure below, and constitute important benchmarks in 
the development of firms’ responses to the labor governance legitimacy crisis in the 
short, medium, and long terms. These points include meeting with President Clinton in 
1996 regarding the Fair Labor Coalition initiative/formation of the AIP, being a member 
of the FLA by the first operational year (2001), being a founding member of the SAC 
(2010), being a current member of the FLA (2016), and/or being a current member of the 
SAC (2016). An overview of the sampling results for each firm is located in Table 1. 
Although there were an additional 5 firms that were early members of the AIP 
and/or the FLA, the sample only included firms that transitioned from the short into the 
medium term, so that “symbolic” versus “sustainable” commitments could be 
determined. Additionally, two firms that met the criteria were ultimately excluded due to 
data limitations—Patagonia and Zephyr Graf X. Both of these companies are private and 
are therefore not required by the SEC to report their board membership information. 
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Data Collection 
I compiled the data into an author-constructed dataset of all directors that served 
on BODs of the focal firms between 1996 and 2014. Overall, there were 131 BOD lists 
and 199 individual directors. Initial data collection came from the Wharton Research 
Data Services (WRDS) database, which collects a range of variables related to board 
directors from S&P 1500 companies, and has BOD information beginning with this 
project’s starting point of 1996, and with the most recent data available being 2014. 
WRDS data was available for 5 of the 8 firms including: Nike, PVH, Nordstrom, Liz 
Claiborne, and Polo Ralph Lauren. Variables provided by WRDS that are relevant to this 
study include: name, age, gender, board affiliation (employee of firm or independent), 
primary company name, and number of other public company boards serving on (number 
of interlocks).  
Information not available from WRDS included the names of any interlocking 
firms, tenure as a board member (available only for more recent years), as well as 
educational background. I collected information unavailable through WRDS—as well as 
for provided information that was incomplete or conflicting—from official corporate 
websites and documents published online, such as PDFs of firms’ Annual Reports to 
Shareholders and documentation on the SEC’s “Edgar” (Electronic Data Gathering, 
Analysis, and Retrieval System) database, such as the 10-K Annual Report forms. 
Ultimately, data on interlocking directors was very limited from WRDS and so I pulled 
that information from additional sources for all 199 directors. 
For firms that were not on the S&P 1500 companies lists, and therefore not 
included in the WRDS database (i.e. Adidas, Reebok and Eddie Bauer), I pulled board 
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membership lists from PDFs of firms’ 10-K Annual Report forms available online from 
the SEC’s “Edgar” database. Overall, I pulled 65% of director lists from WRDS, and 
35% from 10-K filings. A complete inventory of whether each firms’ director lists for 
each year came from the WRDS database or from Annual Report documents is found 
below in Table 2. 
Measurement 
Operationalization:  
The number of interlocking directorships, and names of those firms, was recorded 
for each independent director for every year between 1996 and 2014, with numbers often 
changing throughout one director’s entries. For example, an independent director may be 
on a focal firm’s board for the entire 1996-2014 period and throughout that 19-year 
period hold various additional directorships. Directors were counted as an “interlock” for 
each year they served on one or more additional boards outside of their membership on 
the focal firm’s board. For example, if a director served on three additional boards 
between 1996 and 2000, two between 2001 and 2007, and no additional boards between 
2008 and 2014, this hypothetical director would be counted as one interlock for each of 
the 12 years between 1996 and 2014 that she served. Meaning that only interlock status 
was counted, not the actual number of board interlocks (which in this example would be 
29).  
Director gender was determined first by any available WRDS data. If the data for 
a given director for a given year was incomplete, then gender was determined from 
information provided in professional biographies including name, photos, and use of 
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gender-specific pronouns. Director race/ethnicity was determined in a similar fashion. If 
WRDS data was unavailable, listed as “unknown” or had conflicting information—
differing racial categories for different years (such as “Hispanic” in 1997 and then 
“Asian” in 2002) — information provided in professional biographies was also consulted. 
Race/ethnicity was preliminarily surmised from professional photos. Further research was 
done to confirm (when possible) the individual director’s association with ethnically 
identifying organizations—such as the Black Business Association or the National 
Hispanic Business Group.  
Reliability/Validity:  
For the validity of the racial/ethnic identification of directors, multiple steps were 
taken to confirm the accuracy of a director’s classification. In terms of the reliability of 
racial/ethnic classifications, the accompanying chart (found below in Table 3) shows how 
many directors for each company were determined by the author, with approximately 
23% of all race/ethnicity entries being determined by the author.  
Gender classifications for directors were readily available for the five firms 
included in the WRDS data (Nike, PVH, Nordstrom, Liz Claiborne, and Polo Ralph 
Lauren). Less than 10% of each of these firms’ entries had an “unknown” gender listed 
and none of them had conflicting genders listed in different entries for the same director. 
For the firms not included in the WRDS data, gender was clearly identifiable from 
biographical information including name, photos, and use of gender-specific pronouns.  
Additionally, to ensure inter-coder reliability, a random sample of a third (33%) 
of all directors for which the author determined the race/ethnicity classification (31 of the 
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93 author determined directors) were sent to a colleague. The reviewer was also asked to 
identify the directors’ gender. Both race/ethnicity and gender classifications were 
confirmed by the reviewer with full accuracy: 100% matches in both categories for all 31.  
Despite the inclusion of the “Interlocking Directorship” variable by WRDS, data 
for independent interlock status pulled from WRDS was extremely limited. This was due 
to: (1) a majority of initial lists being incomplete or inaccurate—almost completely filled 
with “0” for all firms for all years; and (2) interlock status was indicated in WRDS data 
for directors of both board affiliation statuses: both independent and employees. 
Therefore, independent interlock status was determined by the author for each director 
included in the dataset (a total of 199 individuals). All directors’ biographical information 
was sourced from company websites, official documents filed with the SEC and available 
online, and/or from websites including Bloomberg and Forbes. The names of the firms 
where directors were independent interlocks were also collected for each year. 
Data Analysis 
Once data collection was completed, a trend analysis was conducted. The three 
primary trend analyses included: 1) number of female directors per year for each focal 
firm 2) number of ethnic/racial minority directors per year for each focal firm and 3) 
number of independent interlocks per year for each focal firm. Trends were compared for 
each of these variables between firms with shorter commitments to labor regulation and 
those with the longer, more sustainable commitments to voluntary regulation of labor 
governance in global production facilities. 
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FINDINGS 
My hypotheses examine two primary questions: whether apparel firms that have 
sustained their commitment to voluntary labor monitoring between 1996 and 2014 will be 
more likely than other firms to, firstly, appoint independent interlocking directors to their 
boards and, secondly, appoint women and racial/ethnic minority directors to their boards. 
All firms increased the number of women and racial minority directors over this period, 
however, least committed firms actually had the most in both categories over the entire 
period. Additionally, trends in the number of independent interlocking directors varied 
quite widely across firm groups within this time period. 
Interlocks 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that firms with sustained commitments to voluntary labor 
monitoring will have been more likely to appoint independent interlocking directors to 
their boards. Results do not support this hypothesis. Firms that were least committed to 
voluntary labor monitoring were found to have a higher percentage of independent 
interlocking directors than more committed firms for all years from the beginning in 1996 
through the end of the period in 2014. However, least committed firms were the only 
group that decreased the overall number of independent interlocks over this period; they 
maintained a higher number than most committed firms merely by started out with 
significantly more independent interlocking directors in 1996. More committed firms had 
a steady increase across the entire period from 19.3% up to 38.7%. Least committed 
firms started much higher at 51%, decreased through the short and medium terms, and 
then leveled off in the most recent period to end at 43%. Thus, the gap between the most 
and least committed firms significantly converged from a 31.7% difference in the 
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baseline period (1996-2000) to a difference of only 4.3% in the most recent period (2010-
2014) (refer to Figure 2). 
Bankrupt, Acquired, and Split Firms: 
A finding of surprising strength came from the category of firms that either went 
bankrupt (Eddie Bauer), were acquired (Reebok), or split into separate firms (Liz 
Claiborne). Collectively, these firms saw an average increase of nearly 60% between 
1996 and 2009: with average independent interlocking director percentages rising from 
22.70% to 82% over this period (refer to Figures 5 and 6). This rise was much sharper 
than that of the most and least committed category groups, indicating that recruiting 
independent interlocking directors served a function during times of other firm crisis as 
well outside of the legitimacy crisis of the 1990s. Suggestions for further research in this 
area are discussed in the conclusion segment of this study. 
Gender and Racial Diversity 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that firms with sustained commitments to voluntary labor 
monitoring will have been more likely to appoint women and racial/ethnic minority 
directors to their boards. Results do not support this hypothesis, while least committed 
firms had higher percentages of women as well as racial minorities on their boards for all 
years between 1996 and 2014. 
Gender: 
The percentage of female board membership increased for all groups over the 
1996 to 2014 time period. With firm groups having averages between 8.5% and 15% in 
the baseline period (1996-2000), firm groups ended with averages between 13.7% and 
23.5% in the final period (2010-2014) (refer to Figure 5). 
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Race: 
The percentage of racial minority board membership increased for all groups over 
the 1996 to 2014 time period. With firm groups having averages between 8.5% and 15% 
in the baseline period (1996-2000), firm groups ended with averages between 13.7% and 
23.5% in the final period (2010-2014) (refer to Figure 6). 
Gender and Racial Similarities: 
In the first transition period, between 1996-2000 and 2001-2005, trends in gender 
and racial minority board membership were the same: most committed firms actually 
decreased their percentages of female and racial minority board memberships, while least 
committed firms increased both of these categories. In the next transition period, between 
2001-2005 and 2006-2009, both least and most committed groups increased their 
percentage female BOD membership, while the most committed group increased and the 
least committed group decreased racial minority membership—thus decreasing the gap 
created in the initial period. In the final transition period, 2006-2009 to 2010-2014, 
female membership converged slightly, ending with a difference of  ~10% (least 
committed firms with 23.5% and most committed firms with 13.7%) and an almost full 
convergence in the racial minority membership leaving only a 1% gap, between 15.70% 
(most committed) and 16.5% (least committed)  (refer to Figure 3). 
 Additionally, the least committed firm group had the most variance in both 
percentage of female board membership—18.5%—and percentage of racial minority 
board membership—15%. The racial minority percentage increase of 15% took place 
between the baseline and short term years, and was an increase of 276%—almost tripling 
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the original percentage from 8.5% to 23.5%. The group comprised of firms that were 
bankrupt, acquired, or split into multiple brands had the least amount of variance, with 
3% variance in female board membership and 2% variance in racial minority board 
membership (refer to Figure 7). 
Lastly, there was a very large contrast between US-based firms and the 2 foreign-
based firms: Eddie Bauer and Adidas (both of which are German). The two German-
owned firms had the two lowest percentages of female and racial minority board 
membership. Adidas had 0% female or racial minority board members for all years, while 
Eddie Bauer had 0% racial minorities for all years and 0% (1996-2000), 6% (2001-2005), 
and 11% (2006-2009) female board membership. 
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DISCUSSION 
This study developed a theoretical framework rooted in institutional theory to 
frame the actions of firms in times of crisis—in this instance, during a legitimacy crisis 
stemming from highly publicized labor abuses in foreign production facilities. In 
considering the different pressures firms face from an institutional theory perspective, 
internal changes to corporate governance represent normative change, while membership 
in voluntary regulatory groups (such as the FLA) represent a coerced change. The 
relationship between normative changes to firms’ BODs and commitment to changes 
brought about by coercive forces (commitment to voluntary regulatory organizations) 
were analyzed. While much scholarship has already established the relationship between 
increased diversity of boards through the addition of women and racial minorities and the 
inclusion of independent interlocks, these internal, normative changes—represented in 
this study by changes to firms’ BOD composition—are the focal point of this study as 
they have not previously been considered by scholars or activists as a mechanism of 
change towards more humane and sustainable labor practices. 
My findings suggest that firms in both the least and most committed groups 
pursued a strategy to appoint more female directors and more directors of racial minority 
background to their boards over the period of 1996 to 2014. However, the group of firms 
least committed to voluntary labor regulation had the highest percentages of both female 
and racial minority board members over this entire period, contrary to the hypothesized 
relationship of the most committed firms having the highest amounts of female and racial 
minority board members. Similarly, firms that were least committed to voluntary labor 
monitoring had a higher percentage of independent interlocking directors than more 
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committed firms from the beginning in 1996 through the end of the period in 2014. Yet, 
least committed firms were the only group to decrease their overall percentage of 
independent interlocking directors over the 1996 to 2014 period. Both most committed 
firms and firms that went bankrupt, were acquired, or split increased their percentages of 
independent interlocking board members over this period. 
Implications for Theory 
This article adds to the understanding of mechanisms that drive organizational 
change in times of crisis by analyzing the internal, normative mechanisms that shaped the 
responses of focal firms during their legitimacy crisis of the 1990’s. It also adds to 
research on board of director composition through analyzing the conditions in which 
firms seek out certain board members, including more diverse members and/or 
independent interlocking board members.  
 
Separate Strategies 
This study intended to synthesize the research on board diversity and interlocks, 
by testing them as similar strategies for firms to deal with an environment of uncertainty. 
However, despite the gender and racial minority data having similar overall trends, these 
trends were very different from those of independent interlocking board members. This 
finding extends current understanding in two ways. Firstly, it sheds more light on 
mechanisms that drive organizational change by illustrating that firms view the internal, 
normative changes of including more directors that promote board diversity—more 
women and racial minorities—as a very different strategy than including more 
independent interlocking directors on the board. Secondly, it extends research on board 
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composition by finding separate reactions to these two board member types by focal 
firms experiencing a common crisis. Especially when paired with the extreme increase of 
independent interlocks over time by firms in the bankruptcy, acquisition and split group, 
these findings provide further insight into what types of external mechanisms (such as a 
legitimacy crisis or other times of crises), motivate firms to seek more diverse boards 
and/or more interlocking board members. 
Symbolic vs Sustainable 
This project also extends knowledge of organizational change by analyzing the 
different internal normative mechanisms (increased board diversity and increased 
interlocking board memberships) that shaped firms’ responses to external pressures 
(maintaining their commitment to voluntary regulation or not). Despite findings being 
overall consistent with the theoretical premise that firms would increase the amount of 
women and racial minorities on boards, as well as increase the number of independent 
interlocks in response to this time of crisis, the fact that the results find the group of firms 
least committed to voluntary labor regulation as having the highest percentages directors 
in each of these categories over this entire period has important theoretical implications.  
This finding indicates support for the argument that firms have made symbolic 
changes to their internal practices that do not translate into meaningful and sustainable 
changes in labor governance in global supply chains. This increased inclusion of racial 
minorities and women, as well as independent interlocks, could represent a symbolic 
gesture in the area of firm governance, mirroring symbolic changes and commitments to 
bettering labor conditions abroad illustrated by previous scholars. These new board 
memberships that add to board diversity could be symbolic in nature, with new members 
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not participating in any meaningful way or contributing any meaningful normative 
changes. 
Implications for Policy and Practice 
The regulation of major firms’ global labor practices has been a contentious issue 
for more than twenty years, and both scholars and labor activist groups are still critical of 
the voluntary compliance model for regulating global labor practices in the present day. 
When considering options for changing the system of voluntary regulation, most scholars 
and activists have focused on external pressures to coerce firms to change. Although this 
study is focused on the internal, normative mechanisms to promote better labor 
governance outcomes, some of the key arguments posed by scholars and activists calling 
for coercive pressure to steer firms away from harmful labor practices and towards more 
humane and sustainable ones are outlined in the following segments. 
 
Central Critiques of Voluntary Regulation 
Criticisms of voluntary regulation of labor practices posed by scholars and 
activists in the late 1990’s centered around a few major areas ignored by the AIP/FLA 
agreements. The major points of contention were that the AIP/FLA code of conduct 
agreement did not include a living wage provision and also had poorly-ensured 
enforcement for freedom of association and collective bargaining of works (Hemphill 
1999). Secondly, the monitoring procedures put forth by the FLA to enforce this code of 
conduct were criticized for two main reasons. Firstly, the extent to which the external 
monitoring was truly “independent” was questioned, while member firms are allowed to 
choose who will perform the monitoring and which factories will be monitored (Hemphill 
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1999). Secondly, union officials questioned the low percentage of eligible manufacturing 
sites to be sampled annually, and stated that it should be much higher (Hemphill 1999).  
Corporate Control over Voluntary Regulation  
Ironic to the focus of this study, the legitimacy of the FLA is also questioned by 
many in large part due to the governance nature of the FLA’s board of directors. The 
FLA’s board always has enough corporate members for them to outweigh representatives 
from labor rights groups and to hold the super majority the FLA requires for key decision 
making (United Students Against Sweatshops 2016). Critics argue that due to this 
unbalanced relationship between activists and corporate interests, the FLA is beholden to 
corporate members (United Students Against Sweatshops 2016). Additionally, the FLA 
does not have any union representation; the only union ever to be a part of FLA (UNITE) 
resigned in 2003, just two years into the FLA being operation (Hemphill 1999). Critics 
further argue that the FLA does not provide any meaningful role for workers, while they 
only perform on-site interviews which allow for worker intimidation (United Students 
Against Sweatshops 2016). Lastly, critics question the transparency of the FLA, because 
they do not provide the actual names of factories they monitor (they provide reports with 
general location areas rather than by identifying factory names) which makes it hard for 
other groups to confirm or deny their findings (United Students Against Sweatshops 
2016).  
Voluntary Regulation as an External Function  
Perhaps the most salient criticism of the private regulation model of organizations 
like the FLA suggested by scholars is that it separates the labor regulation into an 
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external function, rather than integrating it into core business functions. The result is a 
focus on risk management and compliance rather than a genuine commitment to 
sustainability. This critique has been echoed by several scholars: Kytle and Ruggie 
(2005) suggest linking CSR efforts with core business functions to reap full benefits; 
Dhanarajan (2005) seconds this concern by arguing that companies need to forge 
“connectivity and coherence” between their core business operations and their ethical and 
environmental commitments for those commitments to become sustainable. Further, 
Seuring and Mueller (2008) consider this distinction to be between “supplier 
management for risk and performance” (decoupled) and “supply chain management for 
sustainable production” (integrated). Barrientos and Smith (2007) deem the decoupled 
approach the “corporate approach”, focused on compliance and outcome standards, and 
the integrated approach the “civil society approach”, focused on process rights for 
workers. 
The importance of compliance and risk management programs being decoupled 
from or integrated into core business processes cannot be understated.  MacLean and 
Behnam (2010) explain the “dangers of decoupling” in their study looking at an extreme 
case of deceptive sales practices occurring within a large financial services firm. At 
worst, compliance/risk management programs decoupled from core business practices 
can be of a purely symbolic nature, characterized by MacLean and Behnam (2010) as a 
“legitimacy façade”, enabling the company to conduct itself in an unethical manner, 
without the threat of losing its external legitimacy. 
Mechanisms of Change 
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Scholars and activists alike are very critical of the existing voluntary compliance 
model for regulating global labor practices that has been the FLA’s legacy. However, in 
considering possible ways to change corporate practices, scholars and activists tend to 
focus on coercive measures of external control. This study’s findings also have important 
implications for public policy as well as corporate practices. By increasing understanding 
of how and why increased board diversity serves as a mechanism of internal, normative 
change—this study provides further insight into these board members’ role as change 
makers towards more sustainable organizational policies and practices related to labor 
governance and other important issues aside from coercive alternatives imposed on these 
organizations from outside. 
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CONCLUSION 
In studying the apparel industry’s response to the legitimacy crisis, and 
subsequent formation of the FLA, this project was limited by a number of inherent 
factors. Firstly, it provided a rather narrow sample size. Although there were fifteen firms 
associated with the formation of the FLA in some way before 2001, only eight of these 
firms continued with the FLA into at least the second (“short term”) time period of 2005. 
These eight firms were further divided down into sub-categories of being most and least 
committed, and then the additional third category of bankrupt, acquired, or split. Thus, 
each group only had 2-3 member firms. Data was also limited by the inclusion of 
information from the 1990’s, which is less readily available, as well as from foreign 
firms—Eddie Bauer and Adidas. While other countries do not have the same reporting 
requirements as the United States, data was especially difficult to acquire for these two 
firms. Finally, data was constrained to beginning in 1996 and ending in 2014, rather than 
2015, because that is the most recent data available from Wharton’s WRDS database that 
was utilized. 
 In addition to sample size and data availability issues, this project also used 
membership in voluntary labor regulation organizations as an indicator of commitment to 
bettering labor conditions in global supply chains. Although this was done out of 
necessity to analyze firm’s reactions to the legitimacy crisis of the 1990’s—creating and 
joining these organizations was their collective response—scholars and labor activists 
have posed numerous, salient criticisms questioning the efficacy of these organizations. 
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Future research could expand this study in a few different directions. Researchers 
could replication and expand the trend analysis this study utilizes by conducting an 
additional explorative analysis looking for trends in directors’ background information, 
including professional history and educational history. In addition to the Board of 
Directors composition, future scholars should consider the changing composition of 
senior executive leadership teams as a possible normative mechanism and their impact on 
sustainability outcomes. 
Additionally, Scholars could conduct qualitative interviews with firm decision 
makers and ask about how and why gender and racial minority board memberships are 
thought about differently than independent interlocking board memberships. Qualitative 
interviews would also provide an opportunity to inquire about the activity of these 
different types of board members—asking about how frequently female and racial 
minority board members attend board meetings, vote on important issues, and/or generate 
unique policy suggestions in comparison to white male board members as well as 
independent interlocking board members. Scholars could further investigate the relative 
level of influence each of these director types have on sustainability outcomes, such as 
labor governance decisions. 
Lastly, scholars could further explore the relationship between independent 
interlocking board members and other types of firm crises. As evidenced by this study’s 
findings, the firms experiencing bankruptcy, mergers, and splitting off into multiple 
brands had extremely high numbers of independent interlocking board members over 
these periods of crises. 
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